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INTRODUCTION 
A Google Street View car has not driven through Haasville Road 
in Bunkie, Louisiana recently.1  A satellite view shows that this road 
is a long one — it winds to Highway 115 West on one end and meets 
with Catfish Kitchen Road on the other.2  What is beyond Catfish 
Kitchen Road is simply “unnamed.”3  A mass of trees borders 
Haasville Road on its left, and near the 115 West, there are a few 
structures and a white truck.  It is a house, perhaps, or a farm.  Pull 
the map back far enough, and the patches of green become 
overwhelmed by plots of tan, unused land.  This is Haasville Road.  It 
also happens to be part of Census Tract No. 22009030600, tract type: 
low-income community.4 
Census Tract No. 22009030600 is an Opportunity Zone, and it is 
one of 150 such zones in Louisiana.5  It is also one of 8764 such zones 
in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the five U.S. 
territories.6  These designated zones, classified by the IRS and 
nominated by the states, are part of an investment scheme intended 
to stimulate economic development and employment opportunities in 
low-income communities.7  The Opportunity Zone Program requires 
 
 1. Satellite View of Haasville Road, Bunkie, LA, GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/A4LW-WB5A] (search “Haasville Road, 
Bunkie, LA” then follow hyperlink). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., LIST OF DESIGNATED QUALIFIED 
OPPORTUNITY ZONES (2018), https://www.cdfifund.gov/Pages/Opportunity-
Zones.aspx [https://perma.cc/37LY-TJVW]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV. [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions], 
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investors to roll-over qualified capital gains into a Qualified 
Opportunity Fund (“qualified fund”), and in turn, investors receive 
tax benefits depending on how long the investment is held in the 
fund.8  The qualified fund then invests in eligible real estate in these 
designated Opportunity Zones.9  It is seemingly a win-win situation 
— investors are incentivized to channel their excess capital gains into 
qualified funds in exchange or favorable tax benefits, and the 
qualified funds lift up low-income communities and their residents by 
developing and investing in select real estate and business 
opportunities within them.10 
However, not all Opportunity Zones walk and talk like Haasville 
Road.  In New York City, for example, the neighborhood directly 
under and around the Williamsburg Bridge is also a designated 
Opportunity Zone.11  The Google Street View car has clearly been 
through this neighborhood recently.12  Unlike Haasville Road, 
however, rows of buildings line paved streets.  Several restaurants and 
bars, including a well-known steakhouse, call this census tract home.13  
In the District of Columbia, Buzzard Point and NoMa — 
neighborhoods that have recently seen the rise of a new sports arena, 
office buildings, and luxury apartments — are also designated 
Opportunity Zones.14  The Google Street View car has been through 
those areas recently, too. 
This Note argues that the Opportunity Zone Program in 
implementation may not have the intended effect of bolstering low-
income communities for three reasons.  First, the Opportunity Zone 
Program’s current state of disorganization has both halted monies 
 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions 
[https://perma.cc/UXJ2-4VXZ] (last visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Novogradac Opportunity Zones Mapping Tool, NOVOGRADAC, 
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-zone-resource-
center/guidance/novogradac-opportunity-zones-mapping-tool 
[https://perma.cc/UTC4-A3E4] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (picturing Census Tract 
No. 36047054900). 
 12. Satellite View of South 6 Street & Broadway, Brooklyn, NY, GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/7KNP-2JG2] (search “South 6th St. & 
Broadway, Brooklyn, NY” then follow hyperlink). 
 13. Id. (showing the famous Peter Luger Steak House). 
 14. Adam Looney, Will Opportunity Zones Help Distressed Residents or Be a 
Tax Cut for Gentrification?, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/02/26/will-opportunity-zones-help-
distressed-residents-or-be-a-tax-cut-for-gentrification/ [https://perma.cc/PM3B-
74RV]. 
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flowing into low-income communities and left the Program without 
any meaningful way in which to collect and analyze data.  Secondly, 
some of the designated tracts have already begun to show signs of 
gentrification and revitalization, and, thus, any investments poured 
into these areas may be unnecessarily and even recklessly channeled.  
Finally, past zoning programs with tax incentives carried out both 
overseas and domestically have demonstrated that such programs 
have failed at creating employment opportunities and displaced low-
income residents due to rapid gentrification practices. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the Opportunity Zone 
Program, its legislative history, and the current state of the Program.  
Part II questions whether the Opportunity Zone Program can achieve 
the intended effect of bolstering low-income communities and their 
residents, and argues that in its current state, it may not be able to.  
This Note argues that the Opportunity Zone Program may be 
unsuccessful because of its current disorganization, as evidenced by 
the fact that some Zones have been wrongfully designated, and the 
fact that past land zoning initiatives and tax incentives have been 
previously unsuccessful in creating meaningful employment 
opportunities and community developments and initiatives.  Finally, 
Part III suggests measures for the IRS and participating agencies to 
address and adopt moving forward regarding the implementation of 
the Opportunity Zone Program to better serve the communities and 
individuals the legislature intended. 
I. THE CONCEPTION OF THE OPPORTUNITY ZONE PROGRAM: FROM 
THEN TO NOW 
A. Legislative History 
Although the Investing in Opportunity Act (IIOA) was pushed 
through in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,15 the genesis of 
attaching tax incentives to capital gains investment into the nation’s 
low-income neighborhoods was first promulgated in a white paper by 
Jared Bernstein and Kevin A. Hassett for the Economic Innovation 
 
 15. The legislation was introduced into the House and Senate on February 2, 
2017, where it was referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the 
Senate Finance Committee. There were 95 cosponsors for the Investing in 
Opportunity Act — 14 from the Senate and 81 from the House. S. 392, 155th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2017); Investing in Opportunity Act, H.R. 828, 115th Cong. (2017–18), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/828/text 
[https://perma.cc/LJ8N-ECEJ]; Investing in Opportunity Act, S. 293, 115th Cong. 
(2017–18), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/293/all-info 
[https://perma.cc/LJ8N-ECEJ]. 
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Group.16  The white paper recognized the disparity between certain 
areas of the country faring “remarkably well and nearing or 
exceeding their pre-recession economic states” and others “facing 
chronic rates of long-term unemployment and historically low levels 
of new investment.”17  Bernstein and Hassett based their model, in 
part, off of failures of previous incentive structures designed to spur 
economic development in distressed zones.18  Their model proposed 
tapping into the “power of intermediaries” — that is, private equity 
firms, banks, mutual funds, and other small businesses — to pool 
assets and incentive investments in distressed regions via tax 
benefits.19  By February 2017, Bernstein and Hassett’s suggestion had 
found its way into Congress in the form of a bipartisan bill authored 
by Senators Corey Booker and Tim Scott and Congressmen Pat 
Tiberi and Ron Kind.20  Similarly recognizing the vast amount of 
untapped capital gains “just sitting there”21 to the tune of nearly $6.1 
trillion, the legislation devised a way to channel those funds into 
distressed communities by incentivizing long-term private investment 
through tax reform, essentially adopting the model promulgated in 
Bernstein and Hassett’s white paper.22 
 
 16. See JARED BERNSTEIN & KEVIN A. HASSETT, UNLOCKING PRIVATE CAPITAL 
TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DISTRESSED AREAS (2015), https://eig.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Unlocking-Private-Capital-to-Facilitate-Growth.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5VZJ-6CFT]; see also Noah Buhayar, Will ‘Opportunity Zones’ 
Help the Rich, the Poor or Both?, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/will-opportunity-zoneshelp-the-rich-the-
poor-or-both/2019/01/04/2a1e153a-0fe1-11e9-8f0c-6f878a26288a_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/SE6F-6XU3] (noting that Bernstein was an economic advisor to Joe 
Biden when he was Vice President and that Hassett is currently chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers). 
 17. BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 16, at 2. 
 18. See id. at 11–16. 
 19. See id. at 16–20 (pointing to over $2 trillion in unrealized, unused capital gains 
that could be funneled into distressed communities). 
 20. The Investing in Opportunity Act, OPPORTUNITY ZONE DATABASE, 
https://opportunitydb.com/guide/iioa [https://perma.cc/ZLS2-RQP9] (last visited Oct. 
28, 2019). 
 21. See id.; see also 162 CONG. REC. S5125, 5119-01 (daily ed. July 14, 2016) 
(statement of Sen. Scott); BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 16, at 16–17 
(recognizing trillions in unrealized capital gains that could be redeployed into regions 
in need of economic development). 
 22. 164 CONG. REC. S1656, 1646-03 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2018) (statement of Sen. 
Cruz); see also How Tax Reform Could Revive American Entrepreneurship: Hearing 
Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (noting Senator Pat Tiberi, 
speaking in favor for the IIOA’s passage, supported the theory of tax reform as a 
means of “removing artificial barriers” to entrepreneurial stimulation). 
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The IIOA was designed with the 52 million Americans living in the 
nation’s low-income, distressed communities in mind.23  In theory, by 
financially empowering these communities in need and lifting them 
out of their distress, businesses and new opportunities would be 
drawn to these now-viable zones for investment, development, and 
more.24  In turn, the residents of these low-income communities 
would have the chance to showcase “their creativity, their 
intelligence, and their work ethic” through the employment 
opportunities and more that would arise from financial stimulation 
and revitalization of these neighborhoods.25 
B. The Framework of the Opportunity Zone Program 
The Opportunity Zone Program is in part premised on longevity.  
The longer capital gains are held in a qualified fund, the more 
attractive the tax incentives are to investors.26  There are few 
restrictions on the capital gains that can be invested into a qualified 
fund, namely that the property producing the capital gains need only 
be sold or exchanged with a person “unrelated” to the property 
itself.27  The language of the statute in regards to eligible capital gains 
reads “any property,”28 which investors have interpreted to mean that 
gains from the sale of “business, stocks, bonds, cryptocurrencies or 
any other type of investment”29 may all be transferred into a qualified 
fund. 
A qualified fund is an investment vehicle established as either a 
partnership or a corporation for federal taxation purposes.30  
Establishing a fund is an endeavor in paperwork above all else — a 
partnership, corporation, or limited liability company treated as a 
partnership or corporation for federal taxation purposes files Form 
8996 with its income tax return to declare that the fund is organized 
 
 23. 164 CONG. REC S667-05 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2018) (statement of Sen. Tim Scott). 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Meg Epstein, Find Your Investment Opportunity in an Opportunity Zone, 
FORBES (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2019/02/04/find-your-
investment-opportunity-in-an-opportunity-zone/#e80edebe4c64 
[https://perma.cc/M5BH-TX8R]. 
 30. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7. 
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for purposes of investing in qualified Opportunity Zone property.31  If 
the taxpayer is certifying as a qualified fund for the first time, it must 
submit a statement by the end of its first year detailing the fund’s 
purpose of investing in qualified Opportunity Zone property and a 
description of the property’s business.32  Beyond the entity’s self-
certification as a qualified fund, the taxpayer need only roll over its 
qualified capital gains into the qualified fund within 180 days of the 
sale of the property and hold 90%33 of its assets in qualified 
Opportunity Zone property from between the last day of the first six-
month period of the fund’s taxable year to the last day of the fund’s 
taxable year.34  No further approval process by the IRS is required.35 
Once an investor rolls over capital gains into a qualified fund, the 
fund itself must invest the monies into qualified Opportunity Zone 
property within 31 months.36  Except for investment into so-called sin 
establishments,37 the definition of what constitutes qualified property 
is extensive.  Qualified Opportunity Zone stock,38 qualified 
 
 31. Corporations and partnerships that are organized and operate as a qualified 
fund must file, in addition to Form 8996, either Form 1120, Form 1120-F, Form 1120-
REIT, Form 1120S, or Form 1065. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8996 
INSTRUCTIONS 2 (2018) [hereinafter FORM 8996 INSTRUCTIONS], 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-dft/i8996—dft.pdf [https://perma.cc/79YB-KFE9]. The 
entity will also continue to file Form 8996 annually to make known that the fund 
meets the standards set forth in I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017). See INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., FORM 8996 (2018) [hereinafter FORM 8996], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
dft/f8996—dft.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCL4-ZU7U]. 
 32. FORM 8996 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 31, at 2. 
 33. According to the IRS, the 90% standard is “determined by the average of the 
percentage of qualified opportunity zone property held in the QOF as measured on: 
1. The last day of the first 6-month period of the tax year of the QOF, and 2. The last 
day of the tax year of the QOF.”  Id. at 1. 
 34. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017). 
 35. Id.; see Eligible Taxpayers Will Self-Certify to Be a Qualified Opportunity 
Fund, NOVOGRADAC (Apr. 25, 2018, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.novoco.com/news/eligible-taxpayers-will-self-certify-be-qualified-
opportunity-fund [https://perma.cc/W85Y-CQKE]. 
 36. Steve Rosenthal, IRS Proposes Generous Rules For Opportunity Zone 
Investors, But What Will They Mean For Communities?, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2018, 5:34 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenrosenthal/2018/10/23/irs-proposes-generous-
rules-for-opportunity-zone-investors-but-what-will-they-mean-for-
communities/#69b2880e7ff1 [https://perma.cc/FR8Z-V9RH]. 
 37. The IRS defines a “sin establishment” as a “private or commercial golf course, 
country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility, suntan facility, racetrack or other 
facility used for gambling, or any store the principal business of which is the sale of 
alcoholic beverages for consumption off premises.” I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017); see also 
§ 144(c)(6)(B) (2009). 
 38. Qualified Opportunity Zone stock is: 
any stock of a domestic corporation that a [qualified fund] acquires after 
2017 from the corporation, either directly or through an underwriter, solely 
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Opportunity Zone partnership interest,39 and qualified Opportunity 
Zone business property40 all constitute eligible Opportunity Zone 
investments.  Additional proposed regulations issued by the IRS also 
provided three safe harbors with which to determine whether a 
business meets the 50% test to qualify as a qualified Opportunity 
 
in exchange for cash. The corporation must be a qualified opportunity zone 
business . . . when the stock is purchased. The corporation must be 
organized for the purpose of being a qualified opportunity zone business. 
FORM 8996 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 31, at 1. Furthermore, the corporation must 
qualify as a qualified Opportunity Zone business for substantially all of the time the 
qualified fund holds the stock. A qualified Opportunity Zone business is a business 
or trade if: 
substantially all of its owned or leased tangible property is qualified 
opportunity zone business property . . .  and if the trade or business satisfies 
all of the following tests. 1. The business generates at least 50% of its total 
gross income from the active conduct of a qualifying trade or business; 2. 
The business uses a substantial part of its intangible property in the active 
conduct of any such business; 3. Less than 5% of the average of the total 
unadjusted basis of the property of the business is from nonqualified 
financial property; and 4. The business is not a private or commercial golf 
course, country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility, suntan facility, 
racetrack or other facility used for gambling, or any store the principal 
business of which is the sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption off 
premises. 
Id. at 1–2 (emphasis added). 
 39. Qualified Opportunity Zone partnership interest is: 
any capital or profits interest in a domestic partnership that a [qualified 
fund] acquires after 2017 in exchange for cash. The partnership must be a 
qualified opportunity zone business when the [qualified fund] acquires the 
interest. The partnership must be organized for the purpose of being a 
qualified opportunity zone business. The partnership must qualify as a 
qualified opportunity zone business for substantially all of the time the 
[qualified fund] holds the interest. 
Id. at 1. 
 40. Qualified Opportunity Zone business property is: 
tangible property that a [qualified fund] acquires after 2017 and uses in a 
trade or business and that satisfies both of the following tests. 1. The use of 
the property in the qualified opportunity zone originates with the [qualified 
fund], or the [qualified fund] substantially improves the property; and 2. 
During substantially all of the [qualified fund’s] holding period for such 
property, substantially all of the use of such property was in a qualified 
opportunity zone. 
Id. at 1. A qualified fund “substantially improves” property to the satisfaction of the 
first prong if: 
during any 30-month period beginning after the date of the acquisition of 
such property, additions to basis with respect to such property in the hands 
of the [qualified fund] are more than an amount equal to the adjusted basis 
of such property at the beginning of such 30-month period in the hands of 
the [qualified fund]. 
Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
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Zone business.41  In practice, the proposed regulations will open up a 
wider range of acceptable qualifying businesses in Opportunity Zone 
areas, from coffee shops to marijuana dispensaries in states where the 
drug has been legalized.42 
The Opportunity Zone Program rewards investors in a triple-
pronged manner via deferral, reduction, and exclusion.43  First, 
investors are permitted to defer tax on capital gains invested in a 
qualified fund until either the date on which the investment in the 
fund is sold or exchanged, or on December 31, 2026 — whichever falls 
first.44  Second, the Program rewards the longevity of an investment.45  
Depending on the length of time an investor holds a qualified fund 
investment, he may be eligible for a step-up in basis on the original 
investment.46  If an investor holds an investment for over five years 
but less than seven, he or she is eligible for a 10% step-up in basis on 
the original investment.47  If the investor holds the investment for at 
least seven, but less than ten years, an additional 5% is added, leading 
to a 15% step-up in basis on the original investment.48  Finally, for the 
 
 41. If at least half of the hours the business’ employees or contractors are spent in 
the Opportunity Zone, half of the business’ services are conducted within the Zone, 
or if the business’ management and operations are based within the Zone, the 
business may qualify for the incentive. Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 84 
Fed. Reg., 18,652, 18,658 (May 1, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); see also 
supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 42. See Jim Tankersley, Treasury Issues Rules on Tax Breaks for Opportunity 
Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019) [Tankersley, Treasury Issues Rules], 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/business/economy/opportunity-zones-treasury-
regulations.html [https://perma.cc/W7S3-4AU2]. 
 43. See The Investing in Opportunity Act, supra note 20 (noting that there are 
three main tax benefits to entice investors). 
 44. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7. 
 45. Id. 
 46. A step-up in basis as related to Opportunity Zone investments is essentially 
an adjustment in the total amount an investor will pay capital gains taxes on. For 
example, if an investor invests $100,000 into a qualified fund and later holds the 
investment in the fund for between five to seven years, he or she is eligible to pay 
capital gains taxes on a lower investment amount. The percent-reduction is known as 
the “step-up.” See id.; see also I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017); infra note 48. 
 47. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7. 
 48. An example is useful for illustrative purposes. If an investor transfers over 
$100,000 into a qualified fund and holds the investment for over five years but less 
than seven, he will pay capital gains tax on $90,000 instead of the original $100,000 
investment, representing a 10% step-up in basis. If the investor holds the investment 
between seven to ten years, he will pay capital gains tax on $85,000 instead of the 
original investment amount, representing a 15% step-up in basis. Since capital gains 
tax may only be deferred until December 31, 2026, 2019 is a critical year for investors 
interested in stepping-up their original investment by 15% for tax purposes. The 
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patient investor that holds the investment for at least ten years, the 
basis of the investment shall be increased to “its fair market value on 
the date that the [qualified fund] is sold or exchanged.”49  In other 
words, a taxpayer can exclude capital gains tax due on the profits 
resulting from the sale or exchange of a qualified fund’s investment 
after it is held for ten or more years.50  Unsurprisingly, the exclusion 
prong is the most attractive tax benefit to many interested investors.51 
As of September 2019, there are 117 qualified funds in operation 
with a total investment capacity of approximately $37.4 billion.52  
These funds are managed by a range of fund managers, from real 
estate companies and real estate investment groups53 to global 
investment firms54 and hedge funds. Several qualified funds require a 
minimum investment buy-in, ranging from $25,000 to $1 million, and 
specify the type of real estate the fund is interested in investing in.55 
 
reduced tax on the original capital gains investment would thus be due in April 2027. 
See id. 
 49. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7. 
 50. An example is useful for illustrative purposes. If an investor rolled over 
$100,000 into a qualified fund in April 2019 and sold that investment in May 2029, he 
would be eligible for both a 15% step-up in basis on December 31, 2026, and pay 
capital gains tax on $85,000 come April 2027. The investor is further entitled to an 
exclusion of capital gains accrued in the fund since the investment was held for at 
least ten years. Thus, if the original investment made $50,000 in the ten years, the 
investor would not be required to pay capital gains tax on that profit. See I.R.C. § 
1400Z-2 (2017); see also Epstein, supra note 29. 
 51. See What Are Qualified Opportunity Funds?, OPPORTUNITY ZONE 
DATABASE, https://opportunitydb.com/guide/opportunity-funds/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZC8B-88A7] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 52. . Opportunity Zone Fund Directory, OPPORTUNITY ZONE DATABASE, 
https://opportunitydb.com/funds/ [https://perma.cc/Z62P-K6GE] (last visited Oct. 28, 
2019) (providing a directory of 117 Qualified Opportunity Funds from around the 
nation as of September 23, 2019). 
 53. RXR Realty, a New York-based real estate company, and CIM Group, a Los 
Angeles-based real estate investment group, for example, both manage qualified 
funds. Id. CIM Group currently manages a $5 billion fund. Id. 
 54. For example, Fundrise Advisors, LLC and SkyBridge Capital both manage 
qualified funds named Fundrise Opportunity Fund and SkyBridge Opportunity Zone 
REIT, respectively. SkyBridge Capital, as of March 2019, has a fund size of $3 billion 
and is targeting a $1 billion fund. Id.; see also Keith Larsen, So Many Opportunity 
Zones, So Many Questions for Developers, Investors, REAL DEAL (Feb. 15, 2019, 
2:30 PM), https://therealdeal.com/miami/2019/02/15/so-many-opportunity-zones-so-
many-questions-for-developers-investors/ [https://perma.cc/JT9S-MQDT]. 
 55. Investment real estate types include hotels, multi-family housing, office and 
residential spaces, commercial spaces, and student housing. See supra note 52 and 
accompanying text. 
2019] OPPORTUNITY WITHOUT REACH 127 
C.  How Opportunity Zones Were Designated 
Per I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b)(1), a qualified Opportunity Zone is a low-
income community population census tract.56  To qualify as an 
Opportunity Zone, the tract must have been nominated by the chief 
executive officer of the state where the tract is located no later than 
the end of the determination period,57 and the Secretary of the 
Treasury must have been notified in writing of the nomination.58  
Notably, tracts bordering low-income tracts, known as contiguous 
tracts, were also eligible for nomination if the median family income 
did not exceed 125% of the adjusted low-income tract.59  Currently, 
there are 8764 qualified Opportunity Zones designated in the 50 
states, the District of Columbia, and the five major U.S. territories, 
230 of which are contiguous tracts.60  State governors were permitted 
to nominate up to 25% of their eligible tracts as potential Opportunity 
 
 56. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b)(1) (2017). The IRS defines a “low-income community” as 
any population census tract where the poverty rate is at least 20%. If the census tract 
is located within a metropolitan area, the median family income for such tract may 
not exceed 80% of the greater statewide median family income, or the metropolitan 
area median income. If the census tract is located outside a metropolitan area, the 
median family income for the tract may not exceed 80% of the statewide median 
family income. I.R.C. § 45(D)(e) (2018); see also What Are Opportunity Zones?, 
OPPORTUNITY ZONE DATABASE, https://opportunitydb.com/guide/opportunity-zones 
[https://perma.cc/ZLP2-4XD5] (last visited Mar. 27, 2019) (noting that there are 
31,866 census low-income census tracts in the United States, the District of Columbia, 
and the five major territories); Ronald Li, Will New Opportunity Zones Attract 
Investors to the Bay Area’s Poorest Areas?, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018, 4:06 
PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/04/26/us-opportunity-
zones-taxes-vallejo-mare-island.html [https://perma.cc/TQ4V-NMYM] (noting that 
an area’s poverty rate was based on American Community Survey data taken 
between 2011 to 2015 as the country was coming back from the recession). 
 57. The IRS defines the “determination period” as the “90-day period beginning 
on the date of enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act . . . .” I.R.C. § 1400Z-
1(c)(2)(B) (2017). 
 58. Id. 
 59. BRETT THEODOS ET AL., DID STATES MAXIMIZE THEIR OPPORTUNITY ZONE 
SELECTIONS? 2 (2018), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98445/did_states_maximize_their
_opportunity_zone_selections_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NEQ-LY42] (noting that 
contiguous tracts could not represent more than 5% of the total number of tracts 
selected). 
 60. Id. (noting that there were 42,176 eligible tracts in total throughout the 50 
states, the District of Columba, and the five major U.S. territories); see also List of 
Opportunity Zones by State, OPPORTUNITY ZONE DATABASE, 
https://opportunitydb.com/location [https://perma.cc/2AHM-FAJ6] (last visited Oct. 
28, 2019). 
128 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
Zones, or in a state with fewer than 100 qualified tracts, at least 25 
tracts.61 
In practice, state governors and heads of state nominated tracts 
using various criteria and methodology.  In Pennsylvania, for 
example, the Department of Community and Economic 
Development spearheaded the nomination process, taking feedback 
and commentary from “individuals, cities, counties, legislators, and 
organizations” in regard to which neighborhoods most deserved the 
designations.62  Pennsylvania gave special consideration to the state’s 
poorest areas, taking into account the poverty rate, unemployment 
rate, and median family income.  The state also considered anchor 
establishments such as airports and hospitals, and the potential to 
develop affordable housing in the tract, too.63  In Ohio, the 
Development Services Agency worked with “local units of 
government . . . development professionals, development 
organizations, port authorities, and more” and “received over 100 
calls and 238 online submissions, as well as letters of support” in 
contemplating which eligible tracts to ultimately nominate.64  Tracts 
that demonstrated employment creation potential were awarded 
nomination priority, for example, “local cooperation” — that is, the 
number of submitters that nominated a single tract — and “future 
commitments of public/private [sic] investment,” to name a few.65  
The Treasury Department released the official designations based on 
the states’ nominations.66 
 
 61. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 59, at 1. 
 62. Qualified Opportunity Zones, PA. DEP’T. CMTY. & ECON. DEV., 
https://dced.pa.gov/programs-funding/federal-funding-opportunities/qualified-
opportunity-zones/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2019); see also Pennsylvania Submits 
Nominations for Qualified Opportunity Zones to U.S. Department of Treasury, 
GOVERNOR TOM WOLF [hereinafter Pennsylvania Submits Nominations], 
https://www.governor.pa.gov/pennsylvania-submits-nominations-qualified-
opportunity-zones-u-s-department-treasury/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (noting that 
Pennsylvania had 1197 census tracts eligible for Opportunity Zone designation). 
 63. Qualified Opportunity Zones, supra note 62. 
 64. Opportunity Zones, OHIO DEV. SERV. AGENCY, 
https://development.ohio.gov/bs/bs_censustracts.htm [https://perma.cc/7MTQ-J9PB] 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS Announce Final Round of 
Opportunity Zone Designations (June 14, 2019), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0414 [https://perma.cc/ZC26-
4EYD]. 
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II. THE CURRENT ISSUES FRUSTRATING THE OPPORTUNITY ZONE 
PROGRAM 
The Opportunity Zone Program aims to bolster low-income 
communities and their residents by injecting capital to spur economic 
development and employment opportunities in these neighborhoods.  
However, the Program’s current state of disorganization, the 
wrongful designation of several Zones, and failures of past land 
zoning programs with built-in tax incentives both domestically and 
internationally suggest that without further safeguards, regulations, 
and monitoring, the Opportunity Zone Program may not end up 
achieving its goals. 
This Part addresses some of the issues currently frustrating the 
Program’s purpose.  Section II.A discusses how the lack of clarity in 
regard to the IRS’s regulations have given qualified funds pause when 
it comes to making investments in these zones.  Next, Section II.B 
questions whether certain Opportunity Zones have been wrongfully 
designated.  Lastly, Section II.C looks into two past land zoning 
programs with built-in tax incentives, Enterprise Zoning, and the New 
Markets Tax Credit, and suggests these initiatives are not as 
beneficial to local communities as they appear due to their cost 
ineffectiveness and the potential to displace rather than aid low-
income community residents. 
A. The Opportunity Zone Program Is Currently Disorganized and 
Without Meaningful Monitoring Systems 
There is a massive amount of capital ready to deploy in the 117 
qualified funds.67  Some qualified funds are already making headway 
on their investment portfolios.68  The Cresset-Diversified fund, for 
example,69 announced a joint venture with Hines, a real estate 
investment firm, to develop The Preston, a multi-story residential 
 
 67. Opportunity Zone Fund Directory, supra note 52 (noting that some funds are 
targeting fund sizes of $1 billion and over). 
 68. Id.; see also Cresset-Diversified QOZ Fund Enters into Joint Venture with 
Hines Fund’s First Qualified Opportunity Zone Investment, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 6, 
2019) [hereinafter Cresset Fund], 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190206005360/en/Cresset-Diversified-
QOZ-Fund-Enters-Joint-Venture-Hines [https://perma.cc/VK6Y-XM99]. 
 69. The Cresset Diversified Fund is managed by Cresset Capital Management and 
has a fund size of $500 million. The fund is primarily interested in affordable housing, 
hotel, industrial, office, retail, and storage investment opportunities throughout the 
U.S. Opportunity Zone Fund Directory, supra note 52. 
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building in downtown Houston.70  The building will house 373 
apartment units featuring “ten-foot ceilings, engineered wood 
flooring, and Italian wood cabinetry,” and will provide its residents 
with amenities such as a fitness center, skydeck, and “23,500-square-
foot tenth floor amenity level with resort-style pool, covered terrace, 
gas BBQ grills, and lounge seating.”71  The luxury apartment building 
will also boast 6804 square-feet of ground-level commercial space.72 
Several other qualified funds, however, have hesitated in deploying 
their raised capital despite the important 2019 deadline.73  According 
to these qualified funds, there are both simple basics and minutiae 
that must be clarified before they feel comfortable with making 
sizable investments.74  In fairness to the IRS, the agency has 
attempted to address and provide clarification to Opportunity Zone 
investors.  In February 2019, it held a public hearing to gather 
questions and concerns about the Program, an event attended by 
approximately 200 people.75  Amongst the questions put forth were 
whether a sale of an Opportunity Zone asset and the subsequent 
purchase of another would start the clock over again in regards to the 
ten-year holding period, and what exactly “substantially improv[ing]” 
an asset to qualify for the tax benefit means.76  On April 17, just 64 
days later, the IRS issued a lengthy set of regulations addressing 
 
 70. Cresset Fund, supra note 68. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Interested investors must invest their capital gains by the end of 2019 if they 
want to benefit from the 15% step-up in basis on their original investments, as 
investments must be held within a qualified fund for at least seven years by 
December 31, 2026 to qualify. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2017); see also Allison 
Nagel, Investors Need Final Guidance to Move Forward on Opportunity Zones, but 
Some See More Risk in the Wait, BISNOW (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.bisnow.com/san-francisco/news/opportunity-zones/reading-the-tea-
leaves-continued-uncertainty-means-that-some-have-embraced-oz-investment-while-
others-wait-97400 [https://perma.cc/W9BA-MFM7] (noting that some investors are 
hesitant to move forward without additional clarification); Larsen, supra note 54 
(“[Investors] remain cautious enough over of the program’s many unanswered 
questions that few have deployed much of the capital raised.”). 
 74. See Larsen, supra note 54. 
 75. Id.; see also Jim Tankersley, Investors Eagerly Await Trump Rules on 
Opportunity Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Tankersley, Investors], 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/us/politics/opportunity-zones.html 
[https://perma.cc/R4T6-AE5B] (noting that the IRS hearing was attended by and 
large by “investors and civic leaders requesting changes and additions to the rules in 
several areas”). 
 76. Larsen, supra note 54; see also Tankersley, Investors, supra note 75. 
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several of these concerns.77  While it remains unclear if these newly-
issued regulations have provided enough clarification for qualified 
funds to move forward with their investments, a companion 
document released by the Treasury Department asking the public for 
advice and guidance as to how to collect and track qualified funds’ 
investment movement suggests that one, there are still several 
components of the Program that require attention, and two, that data 
collection has not been a priority thus far.78  The lack of meaningful 
monitoring systems stands against the Program’s purpose, given that 
data collection would provide invaluable information as to how the 
Program is operating at the ground level, and more importantly, if it 
is, in fact, benefitting low-income communities and their residents. 
B. The Opportunity Zone Program Inaccurately Designated Several 
Zones 
While states were required to adhere to certain criteria in 
nominating tracts for Opportunity Zone designation, the question 
remains as to whether or not some of the tracts that ultimately earned 
designations truly deserved their inclusion.79  Fresno County in 
California, for example, a few hours’ drive from the Bay Area and 
home to 47 designated Opportunity Zones, is lauded for its “melting-
pot atmosphere, the arts scene, the nearby nature, and the affordable 
housing.”80  This depiction is not to say that Fresno does not have its 
share of problems: poverty and pollution are very much real and 
pressing issues present in the area.81  Furthermore, unlike the nearby 
Silicon Valley, which is teeming with new business and development, 
 
 77. 84 Fed. Reg.. 18,691 (May 1, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
(addressing the reinvestment issue, and allowing for a one-year grace period for a 
qualified fund to reinvest the capital upon the sale of a qualified Opportunity Zone 
asset). The regulations do not provide further clarification as to what “substantially 
improve” means, rather, they redirect the investor back to the original set of 
instructions for Form 8996. Id. Given that the IRS only released the first set of 
regulations in October 2018, eight months after the first Opportunity Zones were 
designated, the turnaround for the release of the second set of regulations was quick 
in comparison. Id. 
 78. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON DATA 
COLLECTION AND TRACKING FOR QUALIFIED OPPORTUNITY ZONES 1 (2019) 
[hereinafter REQUEST FOR INFORMATION], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/reg-
120186-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5DK-8YBL]. 
 79. See Annie Lowrey, Fixing America’s Forgotten Places, ATLANTIC (July 24, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/07/how-do-we-help-this-
place/565862/ [https://perma.cc/T37Q-UKZX]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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technology companies have not flocked to Fresno to set up shop 
despite the area’s affordability and proximity to several major 
California cities.82  Still, Fresno County is a place that “feels on the 
cusp” — it has a strong industrial base, affordable real estate, highway 
foot-traffic, and a “steady supply of educated workers” due to its 
proximity to California State University, Fresno and other higher 
educational institutions.83  One of Fresno’s designated Opportunity 
Zones is home to new development for Amazon, Ulta Beauty, and 
Volkswagen distribution centers.84  Another Zone includes a mixed 
housing and retail commercial development, a project that has been 
in the development stages for quite some time.85 
A second California case study further enlightens the potential 
inaccuracy in Zone designation.  The downtown Berkeley 
neighborhood, adjacent to the University of California, Berkeley 
campus, has a 44.6% poverty rate by-and-large due to the high 
number of students living in the area.86  On a numerical basis, the 
neighborhood technically meets all requirements to qualify as a low-
income community.  But whether or not the area is truly 
impoverished is up for debate, given the fact that many students are 
neither employed on a full-time basis nor do they earn full-time 
salaries.87  Nevertheless, Berkeley’s economic development officials 
audibly supported the downtown neighborhood’s inclusion in the 
Opportunity Zone Program on two premises — one, that the 
neighborhood meets both the income and poverty requirements 
required and two, that “future opportunity for transit-oriented 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. FRESNO CTY. ECON. DEV. CORP., SPOTLIGHT ON FRESNO COUNTY: 2018 REAL 
ESTATE FORECAST 14 (2018), https://www.fresnoedc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/2018-REF-Publication.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMG6-JNCE] 
(showing Amazon, Ulta, Volkswagen, and other companies are developing industrial 
sites in South Fresno); George Hostetter, President Trump’s “Opportunity Zones” 
Could Help the Majority of Fresno, SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY SUN (Mar. 30, 2018), 
http://sjvsun.com/news/fresno/president-trumps-opportunity-zones-help-majority-
fresno [https://perma.cc/C69M-BL8L]. 
 85. FRESNO CTY. ECON. DEV. CORP., supra note 84. 
 86. Li, supra note 56 (noting that the downtown Berkeley neighborhood is 
adjacent to the University of California, Berkeley campus). 
 87. Id. There are roughly 46,000-plus UC-Berkeley students in the downtown 
Berkeley neighborhood, 36,000 of which are undergraduate students and 10,125 of 
which are graduate students. There are also approximately 13,000 additional UC-
Berkeley faculty and staff who either study or work in the neighborhood. 
DOWNTOWN BERKELEY, HAVE YOU BEEN TO DOWNTOWN BERKELEY LATELY? 5, 
http://www.downtownberkeley.com/docs/Retail_Brochure_FORWEB_rev11.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6GWF-HTN4] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019). 
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development [in downtown Berkeley]” could benefit poorer 
neighborhoods, “with residents easily commuting downtown on the 
BART [train].”88 
Though California has the greatest number of Opportunity Zones, 
leading with a total of 879 Zones, only a quarter of the state’s eligible 
low-income tracts were ultimately designated and accepted into the 
Program.89  The downtown Berkeley Opportunity Zone was far from 
the poorest tract in California designated, let alone in Berkeley 
itself.90  Yet, three-quarters of California’s low-income communities 
will go without Opportunity Zone funding despite their potential 
need in favor of downtown Berkeley.91  Then, there is also the glaring 
evidence that some of the designated Zones do not appear to be as 
impoverished as the numbers suggest, due to the use of outdated 
census data and inflated poverty rates in defining the nation’s low-
income communities.92  The downtown Berkeley neighborhood 
elucidates this.  While the neighborhood’s poverty rate far exceeds 
both the national and California’s poverty rate — 14% and 19% 
respectively — downtown Berkeley’s overall unemployment rate sits 
at a mere 2.4%.93  Oakland, by comparison, has a 3.7% unemployment 
rate, and California overall has a 4.6% unemployment rate.94  
Downtown Berkeley also has a median home price of around $1 
million.95  Altogether, these data points suggest a discrepancy 
between the reported poverty rates and reality. 
Fresno County and Berkeley are not unique in regard to 
questionable designations; rather, it is a rampant problem seen 
throughout the nation’s Opportunity Zones.  In San Francisco, the 
 
 88. Li, supra note 56. 
 89. What Are Opportunity Zones?, supra note 56. 
 90. Li, supra note 56 (“More investment could benefit poorer 
neighborhoods . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. (noting that poorer tracts in South and West Berkeley were also included 
in as designated Opportunity Zones). 
 92. HILARY GELFOND & ADAM LOONEY, BROOKINGS INST., LEARNING FROM 
OPPORTUNITY ZONES: HOW TO IMPROVE PLACE-BASED POLICIES 1 (2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Looney_Opportunity-
Zones_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/J579-ALWA] (“[T]he data used to identify places 
worthy of federal subsidies after 2018 dates as far back as 2011.”). 
 93. Li, supra note 56 (positing that the low poverty rate can be attributed to the 
neighborhood’s student residents); see also Sammy Caiola, California Has One of the 
Nation’s Highest Poverty Rates, Again, CAPITAL PUB. RADIO (Sept. 12, 2018), 
http://www.capradio.org/articles/2018/09/12/california-has-one-of-the-nations-highest-
poverty-rates-again/ [https://perma.cc/4H2T-KZQK] (noting California’s high 
poverty rates). 
 94. Li, supra note 56. 
 95. Id. 
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South of Market (SoMa) neighborhood, which has seen billions of 
dollars in new construction in the past ten years, was considered for 
nomination as a designated Opportunity Zone, as was the area near 
Stanford University in Palo Alto, due to its high student population.96  
In the District of Columbia, the Buzzard Point neighborhood 
adjacent to D.C. United’s brand-new soccer stadium, Audi Field, is a 
designated Opportunity Zone even though hundreds of millions in 
upcoming investment have already been planned for both the stadium 
and surrounding area.97  In New York City, a tract in the Upper East 
Side, bounded by Central Park, Park Avenue, East 98th Street, and 
East 106th Street, is a designated Opportunity Zone.  Across Central 
Park in Hell’s Kitchen, the tract bounded by the Hudson River, 10th 
Avenue, West 58th Street, and West 50th Street is also a designated 
Zone, despite the fact that just some 16 blocks away, the Hudson 
Yards residential, office, and shopping mega-complex — “one of the 
biggest real estate projects in the country in recent years” — opened 
in March 2019.98  In Nevada, local businesspeople lobbied 
policymakers to get Storey County, the seat to the Tahoe-Reno 
Industrial Center, onto the list of eligible zones even though the 
County was initially ineligible for designation.99  These communities, 
adjacent to affluent neighborhoods and new developments, are not as 
deprived as other areas in the same city, and thus begs the question as 
to whether development would have inevitably occurred there 
 
 96. Id. (pointing out that both Zones were removed from consideration as 
designated Opportunity Zones after feedback from the cities in question). 
 97. Looney, supra note 14 (noting that according to one estimate, half of D.C.’s 
low-income neighborhoods are in fact, already gentrified — the same can also be said 
of cities such as Portland, Seattle, Minneapolis, and Atlanta); see also Steven Goff, 
D.C. United Will Open Audi Field on July 14, Setting Up All-Star Week on 
Waterfront, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soccer-insider/wp/2018/01/04/d-c-united-to-
open-audi-field-july-14-vs-vancouver-whitecaps [https://perma.cc/4S56-BQKX] 
(discussing how Audi Field, a 20,000-capacity sports arena two blocks from Nationals 
Park, opened in July 2018, at a cost of more than $300 million). 
 98. Azi Paybarah, Hudson Yards: The Making of a $25 Billion Neighborhood, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/nyregion/newyorktoday/nyc-news-hudson-
yards.html [https://perma.cc/L9ND-HLAM] (according to public records and an 
analysis by the New School, the complex cost an estimated $6 billion in tax breaks 
and other government assistance). 
 99. GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92, at 7 (“Clearly, this play [to get Storey 
County on the list of eligible Opportunity Zones] was not motivated by a desire to 
help improve conditions of poor Nevada residents, but instead to deliver tax benefits 
for Nevada investors.”). 
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regardless of the Program’s incentives, and if the investments are 
targeted at the neighborhoods most in need.100 
Studies support the proposition that states did not select Zones 
that are most in need of the designations.101  In 2018, Brett Theodos, 
Brady Meixell, and Carl Hedman conducted a study inquiring into 
whether or not states maximized their Opportunity Zone selections, 
and specifically, examined recent investment flow into the designated 
Zones, if any.102  They ranked each eligible census tract from one-to-
ten, with ten representing areas attracting the highest level of 
investment and one representing the lowest.103  While approximately 
one-third of designated Opportunity Zones were in fact tracts with 
historically low levels of investment, 28% of designated Zones had 
also attracted high levels of investment even before the conception of 
the Opportunity Zone Program.104  On average, the majority of 
states’ investment score hovered between five and six,105 suggesting 
that many Opportunity Zones had already experienced notable levels 
of monetary flow even before their inclusion in the Program.  
Furthermore, a report issued by Hilary Gelfond and Adam Looney of 
the Brookings Institution arrived at a similar verdict: while some 
Zones clearly are in distress, others not so much.106  States, Gelfond 
and Looney concluded, “could have targeted more of their Zones to 
places in deeper distress.”107 
Wrongful designations threaten the Opportunity Zone Program’s 
goal of lifting up low-income communities in several ways.  In areas 
already seeing steady levels of economic investment and 
revitalization, channeling funds into projects that would have 
inevitably occurred regardless of a federal tax incentive draws 
budgeted funds away from the other low-income tracts that did not 
make the final cut for the Program.  Several states either maxed out 
 
 100. Id. at 5. 
 101. See, e.g., GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92, at 5; THEODOS ET AL., supra 
note 59, at 3. 
 102. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3, 10–11 (discussing how investment flows 
to tracts were scored based on four components: commercial lending, multifamily 
lending, single-family lending, and small business lending. Since there is not currently 
information available about existing equity flows “at small areas of geography across 
the dimensions of interest,” debt flows are another means of understanding local 
access to capital). 
 103. Id. at 3. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 5. 
 106. See generally GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92. 
 107. Id. at 5. 
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or came close to maxing out their nomination slates by putting forth 
the full 25% of eligible tracts, meaning that in these states, three-
quarters of low-income Zones are now without funding, and 
possibility even development, at the expense of Zones that may not 
truly require either.108  Storey County, Nevada, for example, became 
a designated Opportunity Zone at the expense of Dayton, Nevada, a 
far more impoverished neighborhood.109 
Channeling funding into areas that are already undergoing 
revitalization may also end up harming the very individuals the 
Opportunity Zone Program seeks to aid.  Critics of the legislation see 
the expansion and creation of new local businesses and the 
rehabilitation of existing property in these distressed zones as, at best, 
“an optimistic scenario.”110  To them, the Program’s tax incentives are 
a so-called “subsidy for gentrification,” and here, gentrification is far 
from a positive thing.111  Incentivizing tax breaks correlates, perhaps 
inevitably, with high business profitability, property values, and rent 
rates, given investors’ interest in high returns on their investment.  
Economic theory suggests that high returns on investment “will flow 
to [investments] in the fastest gentrifying areas.”112  Meanwhile, as 
these businesses move in, local residents may be displaced out for the 
individuals with the educational credentials and incomes to qualify for 
and afford these jobs and lifestyles.113  As high-rise, luxury apartment 
buildings soar in these Zones, the current residents of the 
 
 108. State-by-State Analysis, URBAN INST., 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/urban_statesozs_update.xlsx (last visited 
Oct.28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/UP6F-UTCV] (showing states like California and 
New York maxed out their nominations for designating Opportunity Zones); see also 
Pennsylvania Submits Nominations, supra note 62 (noting that the state nominated 
its maximum of 300 tracts). 
 109. GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92, at 7. Dayton, Nevada, unlike Storey 
County, is a true “economically depressed neighborhood that lacks Storey County’s 
huge industrial center.” Damian Paletta, After Nevada GOP Push, Treasury 
Changed Lucrative Policy Benefitting One County, WASH. POST. (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/after-nevada-gop-push-treasury-
quietly-changed-policy-benefiting-one-county/2018/06/22/d142acfc-74c5-11e8-b4b7-
308400242c2e_story.html [https://perma.cc/U8XW-LD2N]. While Storey County’s 
median income is $65,608, Lyon County’s median income — where Dayton is located 
— sits at just $49,007. Id. 
 110. Looney, supra note 14. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.; see also THEODOS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3 (“[I]n communities already 
experiencing high levels of socioeconomic change further investment places low-and 
moderate-income residents at risk of displacement, and therefore Opportunity Zones 
in these areas may be less likely to result in benefits for residents in need.”). 
 113. See Looney, supra note 14. 
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neighborhood may find themselves unable to afford the increased 
rent rates that comes with upgrading these areas, not to mention the 
increased cost of living.114  States themselves may also feel pressured 
to maximize the Program’s tax benefits to their citizens and 
developers, and consequently could push for qualified funds to invest 
in already-gentrifying neighborhoods which “are guaranteed to have 
large capital gains,” as opposed to deeply distressed areas where 
investment is speculative at best.115  Thus, despite the Program’s 
purpose to create opportunities for the individuals living in these 
distressed neighborhoods, that goal may not come to fruition for 
current residents living in Opportunity Zones.116 
C. The Opportunity Zone Program Has Not Accounted for the 
Failures of Similar Zoning Programs 
In a way, the Opportunity Zone Program is not the first economic 
development policy of its kind.  In the past 40 years, the U.S. has seen 
two programs with similar goals to that of the Opportunity Zone 
Program: Enterprise Zones and the New Market Tax Credits. 
i. Enterprise Zones 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the majority of states implemented 
Enterprise Zone legislation, which cited aims very similar to that of 
the Opportunity Zone Program — to “provide tax preferences to 
capital and/or labor and other development incentives in an attempt 
to induce investment expansion or location, and to enhance 
employment opportunities for residents in depressed areas.”117  Like 
Opportunity Zones, Enterprise Zones also relied primarily on 
private-sector investment.118  Typical Enterprise Zone programs 
provide tax incentives such as subsidies to capital or labor, or both, to 
 
 114. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3 (“With respect to benefit, low-and 
moderate-income residents will need to be able to afford to remain their communities 
as the areas the areas upgrade — not be displaced — if they are to benefit from the 
gains Opportunity Zones bring.”). 
 115. Looney, supra note 14. 
 116. See 164 CONG. REC. S667-05 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2018) (statement of Sen. Tim 
Scott). 
 117. Leslie E. Papke, What Do We Know About Enterprise Zones?, 7 TAX POL’Y 
& ECON. 37, 38 (1993); see also ALAN H. PETERS & PETER S. FISHER, W.E. UPJOHN 
INST. FOR EMP. RES., STATE ENTERPRISE ZONE PROGRAMS: HAVE THEY WORKED?. 
23 (2002) (noting how Enterprise Zone policy geographically targeted economically 
depressed areas in need of regeneration). Between 1981 and 1991, 39 states and the 
District of Columbia adopted some form of Enterprise Zone programming. Id. at 1. 
 118. PETERS & FISHER, supra note 117, at 23. 
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lower the cost for businesses in the area.  In theory, business and 
production in those areas would, in turn, increase.119  A labor subsidy, 
for example, would lower labor costs, increase the use of labor as well 
as capital, and bolster output and employment.120 
Even before the federal government authorized Enterprise Zones, 
their effectiveness was called into question.121  Tax induced 
investment in distressed Zones, the naysayers argued, was merely 
investment relocated from somewhere else and in essence, a “zero-
sum game for the country as a whole.”122  On the other hand, 
investment into these areas could both incentivize an existing business 
to relocate to those neighborhoods and stimulate new businesses that 
otherwise may not have been inclined to begin in those 
neighborhoods, which in turn could produce taxable profits and 
incomes to reduce the revenue cost of the tax incentives.123 
By and large, Enterprise Zones were considered failures both 
domestically and abroad.124  Alan H. Peters and Peter S. Fisher 
conducted an extensive study that thoroughly examined Enterprise 
Zones across multiple states, concluding that Enterprise Zones were 
 
 119. Papke, supra note 117, at 41 (noting how, in theory, these subsidies should 
“tend to increase zone production”). 
 120. See id. (discussing how subsidies to both capital and labor can increase 
Enterprise Zones’ production by both encouraging existing firms to increase 
production and by promoting new firms to relocate and expand into the Enterprise 
Zones so that they can benefit from these tax incentives). Labor subsidies include 
employer tax credits for new employees, employee income tax credits, and job 
training tax credits, amongst others. Id. at 49. 
 121. See id. at 38–39 (discussing the criticism of Enterprise Zoning programs). 
Enterprise Zones were first authorized under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993, which allowed for the designation of nine Empowerment Zones and 
ninety-five Enterprise Zones. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA-
93), Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 543 (1993). 
 122. Papke, supra note 117, at 39. 
 123. Id. at 39, 41. 
 124. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Enterprise Zones: A Bipartisan Failure, FISCAL 
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2014/01/10/Enterprise-Zones-Bipartisan-
Failure [https://perma.cc/7NNV-JYAC] (noting that Enterprise Zones are “at best a 
very weak generator of jobs” and that there was “no significant difference in 
economic growth or job creation inside the enterprise zones from the surrounding 
area”); California’s Enterprise Zone Program Fails to Create Jobs, PUB. POL’Y INST. 
CAL., https://www.ppic.org/press-release/californias-enterprise-zone-program-fails-to-
create-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/9SE4-EEC5] (last visited Apr. 7, 2019) (stating that the 
Enterprise Zone Program “failed to achieve its key goal: increasing jobs”); PETERS & 
FISHER, supra note 117, at xi (noting that Enterprise Zones’ implementation at the 
state level “has not been a success”); Papke, supra note 117, at 47 (“[The] British 
zone program has failed in its goal of generating new industrial activity.”). 
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unsuccessful for several reasons.125  According to Peters and Fisher’s 
calculations, the Enterprise Zone Program created roughly 9% of 
induced jobs.126  For these Enterprise Programs to be successful, 
however, cities would need at least 30% in induced jobs to come out 
ahead.127  Additionally, states with Enterprise Zones also saw a net 
loss of establishments under such programming and averaged a 1.2% 
decline in businesses and establishments per year over six years due 
to a “pronounced comparative disadvantage” in attracting and 
holding onto capital-intensive sectors of manufacturing.128  Enterprise 
Zone programming also failed to create employment for low-income 
community-residents, as the Zones ended up attracting the majority 
of its workers from commuters living outside the areas.129  Other 
research concluded that Enterprise Zones did nothing at all for the 
communities involved.130 
British Enterprise Zones, which focused primarily on industrial and 
commercial revitalization in mostly vacant and deteriorating 
industrial neighborhoods experiencing under population, were 
unsuccessful, too.131  Surveys did not find any real difference between 
employment creation, investment behaviors, or business between 
Enterprise Zones and non-Enterprise Zones.132  These surveys 
further noted that only 25% of new jobs within these areas were 
induced jobs.133  Other studies quantified the cost of the British 
 
 125. PETERS & FISHER, supra note 117, at xi (discussing how Enterprise Zones also 
fail to influence business decisions). 
 126. Id. at 10 (defining induced jobs as jobs that would not have existed in the 
Enterprise Zone but for the inducement packages). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 11–12 (noting that while 11 Zones experienced net growth of over 10%, 
24 Zones experienced declines of 15% or more). 
 129. Id. at 14 (noting that the commute time for workers in Enterprise Zones was, 
on average, longer than that of workers employed elsewhere in regions that 
contained Enterprise Zones, suggesting that proximity between home and 
employment did not necessarily improve employment accessibility). 
 130. See BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that research into 
Enterprise Zones “found little impact of the programs on local job markets” and that 
it was not possible to tie any improvements in poverty and unemployment to 
Enterprise Zoning). 
 131. TIMOTHY P.R. WEAVER, BLAZING THE NEOLIBERAL TRAIL: URBAN 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (2015); see also Papke, supra 
note 117, at 47. 
 132. Papke, supra note 117, at 47. 
 133. Id. 
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Enterprise Zone Program and estimated that each induced job 
created cost between $35,000 to $45,000 in lost revenue.134 
Several theories have been put forth speculating as to why 
Enterprise Zone programming failed as spectacularly as it did.  For 
one, businesses learned how to circumvent the system and engaged in 
rent-seeking behavior by relocating businesses just outside of an 
Enterprise Zone into one.135  High tax rates, furthermore, were never 
the reason why businesses failed to invest in Enterprise Zones before 
they were even designated as such.136  Rather, the lack of educated 
laborers, transportation, and a moneyed population in these areas 
drove away potential investment.137  Enterprise Zone policy 
neglected to address these issues. 
ii. The New Markets Tax Credit 
Like both Enterprise and Opportunity Zones, the New Market Tax 
Credits (NMTC)138 encourages investment in distressed zones by 
providing institutions and individuals with federal income tax credits 
for investing in Community Development Entities (CDE).139  CDEs 
are specialized financial vehicles created to provide loans, fund 
investments, and counsel low income communities in financial 
matters.140  Much like qualified funds, CDEs make equity investments 
into low-income communities141 and businesses, and in turn, taxable 
 
 134. Timothy Weaver, The Problem With Opportunity Zones, CITYLAB (May 16, 
2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/the-problem-with-opportunity-
zones/560510/ [https://perma.cc/ZK2Q-ZKKH]. While proponents of the British 
Enterprise Zone Program cite Canary Wharf, a previously dilapidated neighborhood 
turned financial hub as an example of the Program’s success, Canary Wharf is also 
still home to some of the most income-deprived households in the United Kingdom. 
Id. 
 135. Bartlett, supra note 124. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 139. DONALD J. MARPLES & SEAN LOWRY, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: AN 
INTRODUCTION 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34402.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MH2Z-PQH5]; see also MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL ET AL., NEW 
MARKETS TAX CREDIT (NMTC) PROGRAM EVALUATION 2 (2013), 
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/NMTC%20Program%20Evaluation%20Final%2
0Report.pdf 3 [https://perma.cc/VH6L-JD9D]. 
 140. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 139, at 2. 
 141. Id. at 3 (stating that like the Opportunity Zone Program, qualifying “low-
income communities . . . have at least one of the following criteria: (1) has a poverty 
rate of at least 20%, (2) is located in a metropolitan area with a median family income 
below 80% of the greater of the statewide or metropolitan area median family 
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investors earn tax credits, which they are eligible to claim at 5% for 
the first three years, then at 6% for the subsequent four years as long 
as the investments remain in those communities.142 
While the NMTC has not fared as poorly as Enterprise Zones have 
in the public eye,143 it has received its fair share of criticism, too.144  
One study of the NMTC suggests that while funds may have shifted 
from high to low-income communities, there is also no evidence 
pointing to any increase from corporations in their investment 
levels.145  This phenomenon suggests that corporations may be 
receiving credits for investments they would have made regardless of 
tax incentives.146  The NMTC has also been criticized as overly 
confusing and difficult to navigate, even for the financial institutions 
directly involved in funding and loaning procedures.147 It also lacks 
controls and regulation to prevent excessive rates of return, potential 
duplication of benefits, and high costs.148 Furthermore, while the 
NMTC did create jobs, on average, each job created cost $53,162 in 
 
income, or (3) is located outside a metropolitan area, with a median family income 
below 80% of the median statewide family income.”). 
 142. Id. (noting that there are four types of qualified low-income community 
investments: (1) loans or investments to qualified low-income community businesses; 
(2) provision of financial counseling; (3) loans or investments in other CDEs; and (4) 
the purchase of loans from other CDEs). 
 143. See, e.g., Paul Anderson, The NMTC, Business Financing, and 
Entrepreneurship, NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL. (Feb. 21, 2018), 
http://nmtccoalition.org/2018/02/21/the-nmtc-business-financing-and-
entrepreneurship/ [https://perma.cc/T6J5-MVQG] (praising the NMTC’s hand in 
creating construction employment, even though such jobs may be temporary); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, $3.5 Billion in New Markets Tax Credits 
Awarded to Spur Economic Growth Nationwide (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-release/sm0288 [https://perma.cc/T7KU-B73C] 
(noting that the NMTC has created 750,000 jobs and led to the construction and 
rehabilitation of over 190 million square feet of commercial real estate) 
 144. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 16, at 9–11 (stating that the 
NMTC is “overcomplicated”); MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 139, at 7 (suggesting 
that the NMTC be simplified and that geographic distribution of activity has been 
concentrated into only a few states). 
 145. Tami Gurley-Calvez et al., Do Tax Incentives Affect Investment? An 
Analysis of the New Markets Tax Credit, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 371, 373 (2009). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See JAMES R. WHITE ET AL., NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: BETTER CONTROLS 
AND DATA ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVENESS 10 (2014), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664717.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLT5-XB9P] (stating 
that the NMTC financial structure has only “become more complex and less 
transparent over time”); Roshan Rajabi, Inside the New Markets Tax Credit 
Program: Who Is the Real Winner?, BOLLER REV. 296, 298–303 (2017) (discussing 
how “many . . . in the field of finance — commercial banking specifically — are 
unclear on what the NMTC program is”). 
 148. WHITE ET AL., supra note 147, at 12. 
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tax credits, and the number created was small when squared against 
the cost.149  The leeway in the NMTC’s definition of “low-income 
community” ensures almost all neighborhoods, even historically 
affluent ones like Beverly Hills and the Hamptons, could stand to 
benefit from the program.150 
The problems that plagued Enterprise Zones and the NMTC are 
present in Opportunity Zone programming, too.  Opportunity Zone 
programming, much like Enterprise Zone programming, does not 
currently account for businesses interested in gaming the system, nor 
does it regulate for non-zone residents usurping employment 
opportunities meant for residents within these low-income Zones.151  
Furthermore, the Opportunity Zone Program uses the same 
definition of low-income communities the NMTC adopted.152 Even 
now, there is evidence that some designated Opportunity Zones may 
already be on the road to gentrification and thus, may not require or 
benefit from supplemental funding as much as other zones.153  
Furthermore, like the NMTC, the Opportunity Zone Program has 
also been criticized for being confusing and complicated; the delay in 
clarification and additional regulations has only exacerbated these 
concerns.154  Without regulation and policy addressing the areas 
where Enterprise Zones and the NMTC faltered, the Opportunity 
Zone Program may fall victim to the same pitfalls given the 
similarities in the legislation and overarching purpose.  
 
 149. Bartlett, supra note 124. 
 150. See TOM COBURN, BANKING ON THE POOR: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA 
EXPLOITS STRUGGLING COMMUNITIES TO COLLECT NEW MARKET TAX CREDITS i 
(2014). 
 151. Bartlett, supra note 124 (addressing how a lack of educated individuals, 
transportation, and a moneyed population in Enterprise Zones may have contributed 
to its failure). See generally I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017). 
 152. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2017); see also MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 139, at 
3. 
 153. See Looney, supra note 14 (discussing how some Census data defining low-
income communities date back to 2011, and that possibly half of the low-income 
zones in the District of Columbia, Seattle, Portland, Minneapolis, and Atlanta may 
already be gentrified). 
 154. See Partner Insights, Opportunity Zones: The Do’s and Don’ts of Real 
Estate’s Most Exciting Investment Vehicle, COM. OBSERVER (Dec. 11, 2018, 2:50 
PM), https://commercialobserver.com/2018/12/opportunity-zones-the-dos-and-donts-
of-real-estates-most-exciting-new-investment-vehicle/ [https://perma.cc/8FTE-95ZF] 
(calling Opportunity Zones “exciting, but often confusing”); see also Robert D. Matt, 
FAQ: Understanding Opportunity Zones, KAUFMAN ROSSIN (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://kaufmanrossin.com/blog/faq-understanding-opportunity-zones/ 
[https://perma.cc/8TH7-A74C] (calling Opportunity Zones “complicated”); Nagel, 
supra note 73 (stating that investors have been hesitant to move forward). 
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III. MOVING FORWARD: WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE 
This Note proposes measures that the IRS, the Treasury 
Department, and the states themselves can take in an effort to ensure 
the Opportunity Zone Program truly benefits the intended low-
income communities and their residents.  Section III.A suggests 
measures the IRS and the Treasury Department should adopt going 
forward to better ensure that investors are not deterred away from 
participation due to lack of knowledge, and that as much 
transparency and oversight is included as possible.  Section III.B then 
puts forth measures state officials can undertake to better ensure that 
their low-income communities and residents are truly the areas and 
individuals benefitting from the Opportunity Zone Program. 
A. What the IRS and the Treasury Department Can Do 
i. The IRS and Treasury Department Should Continue to Clarify the 
Existing Regulations 
The second set of regulations the IRS promulgated on April 17, 
2019 is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, as the agency has 
stepped forth and clarified several key components of the Program 
that required further explanation.  The 169-page document has 
provided useful clarification as to what “50 percent of a business’ total 
gross income” means to qualify for the tax incentives,155 how long an 
investor has to reinvest gains if he sells an Opportunity Zone asset,156 
and what the parameters are for vacant property.157  The regulations 
have also provided a more comprehensive definition as to what 
“substantially all” means in regards to investment in qualified 
Opportunity Zone stock and partnership interest158 and have made it 
 
 155. 84 Fed. Reg.. 18,691 (May 1, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
(clarifying the three safe harbors a business may comply with to benefit from the 
Program’s tax incentives). 
 156. Id. at 163 (providing investors with a one-year grace period in which to 
reinvest gains made from an Opportunity Zone asset into another Opportunity Zone 
asset). 
 157. Id. at 12 (clarifying the purchase of vacant property by a qualified fund — If 
the acquired property has been standing vacant for five or more years before the 
purchase of such property by the qualified fund, the purchased property will satisfy 
the original use requirement). 
 158. Tony Nitti, IRS Releases Latest Round of Opportunity Zone Regulations: 
Where Do We Stand Now?, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2019/04/22/irs-releases-latest-round-of-
opportunity-zone-regulations-where-do-we-stand-now/#3ed372c42772 
[https://perma.cc/J9H4-BAAW]; FORM 8996 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 31, at 1–2 
(stating that if a qualified fund is investing in stock or a partnership interest, the 
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easier for startup companies and existing businesses to become 
involved with Opportunity Zones,159 thus potentially diversifying the 
real-estate-heavy investments seen so far.  Still, however, other pieces 
of necessary information remain without clarification.160 
While it remains unclear as to whether investors’ concerns have 
been sufficiently assuaged with the new regulations, the IRS and the 
Treasury Department should continue to address the queries and 
concerns in a timely manner if they are serious about achieving the 
Program’s goals.  Though the IRS and Treasury Department appear 
uninterested in issuing a third set of regulations and clarifications, it 
may be in the agencies’ best interest to do so, as guidance is still 
needed for several key components of the Opportunity Zone 
Program.161  2019 is an important year for generating cash flow and 
interest in investors, as the 15% step-up in basis on the original 
investment will only apply to investments made by the end of the 
year.162  To ensure that investors remain interested in the Program — 
and perhaps more importantly, that their investments stay within 
qualified funds and Opportunity Zone neighborhoods — the IRS 
 
corporation or partnership must be a qualified Opportunity Zone business for 
“substantially all” of the time the fund holds the stock or interest). Id. at 7–9. The 
second set of Regulations defines “substantially all” as at least 90% of the qualified 
fund’s holding period. Id. at 1–2. 
 159. Michael Cohn, Opportunity Zone Rules Aim to Spur Further Business and 
Real Estate Investment, ACCT. TODAY (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/opportunity-zone-rules-aim-to-spur-further-
business-and-real-estate-investment [https://perma.cc/5FUH-DAYT] (noting that the 
safe harbors in the new regulations have made it easier for startup companies and 
existing businesses to participate in the Program too). 
 160. See id. (directing investors back to the original definition of “substantially 
improve” in the legislation, the same definition that initially confused investors); see 
also Tankersley, supra note 42 (discussing how agencies have yet to clarify how 
important data will be collected). 
 161. See Lydia O’Neal, No Plan for Third Round of Opportunity Zone Rules, 
Officials Say, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2019, 2:00 PM), 
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/no-plan-for-third-round-of-
opportunity-zone-rules-officials-say [https://perma.cc/LG7C-PCRB] (reporting that 
the IRS and Treasury Department have no plan for a third set of regulations). 
Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel Krishna Vallabhaneni stated “I don’t know what 
would even be in a third reg [sic]” despite parties calling for guidance on anti-abuse, 
de-certification, and penalties, amongst others. Id. 
 162. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017) (stating that capital gains tax on original 
investments channeled into qualified funds may only be deferred until December 31, 
2026); see also Matthew Rothstein, Delays Could Be Good News for Philadelphia, 
BISNOW (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.bisnow.com/philadelphia/news/opportunity-
zones/opportunity-zone-deadline-different-investments-good-news-98359 
[https://perma.cc/4NRT-56QL] (discussing how the 15% step-up in basis only applies 
to investments made by the end of 2019). 
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must continue to provide clarity on key components of the Program 
before both the end of 2019 and before the 15% step-up in basis 
incentive terminates.  Or else, they risk losing both investments and 
investors’ interest.163 
ii. The IRS and Treasury Department Should Regulate Opportunity 
Zones That May Not Be as Distressed as Others 
To help low-income neighborhoods and their residents, legislation 
and programming must actually be directed towards these areas.  
Currently, the evidence demonstrates some of the designated Zones 
may not be as distressed as the outdated data suggests that they 
are.164  Though tracts have already been designated as Opportunity 
Zones and no current provision exists in the legislation to remove, re-
designate, or otherwise alter the designation of tracts, the IRS could 
still put forth additional regulations to more accurately target 
distressed areas in need of Opportunity Zone funding. 
For one, several college towns were selected as Opportunity Zones 
due to their high qualifying poverty rates.165  Other selected tracts 
may be well on the road to gentrification already.  Several designated 
neighborhoods have seen millions of dollars in new investment in the 
past couple of years and bear the signs of revitalization: a flagship 
Whole Foods and a Trader Joe’s, new sports arenas, and 
headquarters for technology darlings like AirBnB and Uber.166  While 
the tracts may have qualified for nomination based on the definition 
of “low-income community,” the census data used to define these 
Zones is outdated and thus, fails to accurately capture a true picture 
 
 163. While interested investors can still qualify for a 10% step-up in basis if they 
invest into Opportunity Zones after 2019, since an investment must be held for at 
least seven years by December 31, 2026 to qualify for a full 15% step-up in basis, 
investors will lose the extra 5% step-up in basis if they do not invest by the end of 
2019. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017). 
 164. See discussion, supra Section II.B; see also GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 
92, at 1, 5 (stating that it is “obvious” that to help individuals in distressed 
neighborhoods, those neighborhoods actually need to be targeted). 
 165. See GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92, at 9–10 (noting how “subsidizing 
college campuses is not what Congress intended” in regard to Opportunity Zone 
programming). The neighborhood housing the University of Southern California in 
Los Angeles, located in Census Tract 222700 has an official poverty rate is 88%, and 
yet, 99% of its residents are enrolled in college. Id. 
 166. See Looney, supra note 14 (pointing out that San Francisco’s SoMa 
neighborhood qualifies as a designated Opportunity Zone, even though it is home to 
trendy supermarkets and sporting goods stores) Several other major cities also are 
home to “gentrifying hotspots” that nevertheless, qualify as Opportunity Zones. Id. 
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of what a Zone looks like.167  Establishing a more accurate definition 
of a low-income community168 and updating census data to better 
catalog the nation’s distressed zones should be a priority for the IRS 
moving forward.169 
In doing so, the federal government would have a clearer 
understanding of exactly which Zones are, in fact, distressed, and 
could implement regulations that guard against exploitation of the 
Program accordingly.  Regulations guarding against excessive 
investment in illusory low-income communities — that is, college 
towns with inflated poverty levels and already-gentrifying 
neighborhoods — could be put into place.170  A cap on the dollar-
amount spent, or a restriction on the number of projects carried out in 
these particular Opportunity Zones could help counteract investors’ 
tendency to seek for high returns in investment in the areas 
gentrifying most rapidly.171  More stringent restrictions on the types 
of projects that may be carried out in these illusory Zones may prove 
useful, too.  The majority of the projects stimulated thus far under the 
Opportunity Zone Program have been real estate ventures such as 
luxury apartment buildings and hotel developments.172  However, 
 
 167. See id. (pointing out that the Treasury Department relied on maps of census 
data, some of which dated back to 2011). 
 168. GELFOND & LOONEY, see supra note 92, 8–10. One measure that could be 
implemented in redefining poverty and low-income communities could be to exclude 
students from the census count. Another could be to look for additional indicators of 
distress, such as child poverty rates when designating low-income communities. Id. 
 169. See Looney, supra note 14. 
 170. See FORM 8996 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 31, at 1–2 (stating that while 
qualified funds themselves must invest at least 90% of their funds into qualified 
Opportunity Zone property, stock, interest, business, or business property per year, 
there are no minimum or maximum thresholds an Opportunity Zone itself must meet 
to qualify as such. Therefore, state-imposed regulations as described above would 
still be within the statutory guidelines); see also GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92, 
at 12 (noting that it is “incumbent on states and localities to direct investments” and 
that they have available to them the “tools they’ve used before — zoning, local hiring 
requirements, property or other tax incentives, preservation, [and] assistance to 
homeowners”). 
 171. See Looney, supra note 14. 
 172. See Cresset Fund, supra note 68 (detailing a luxury apartment under 
development in a Houston, Texas Opportunity Zone); Tankersley, Investors, supra 
note 75 (describing a SpringHill Suites by Marriott hotel project under development 
in Phoenix, Arizona). Though the additional regulations have expanded the types of 
eligible businesses to “service transactions and employee location,” it remains to be 
seen whether qualified funds will end up diversifying their portfolios or if they will 
continue to invest in profitable luxury living real estate. Mary Childs, Opportunity 
Zones Just Got Clearer, Giving Investors a Green Light, BARRON’S (Apr. 19, 2019, 
1:13 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/opportunity-zone-rules-tax-investments-
51555693905 [https://perma.cc/3L3Z-YU24]; see also DC Opportunity Zones, 
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these projects may not be all that beneficial to the residents living in 
these neighborhoods, who may not be able to afford rent on an 
apartment with all the bells and whistles.  Creating and enforcing 
regulations that curtails the displacement of residents in distressed 
communities or that draws in employees from outside the Zones by 
limiting investment opportunities would better ensure that the 
Program truly benefits those it is intended to benefit. 
iii. The IRS and Treasury Department Should Implement Data 
Collection and Monitoring Systems 
In April, the Treasury Department issued a request for information 
seeking public input on data collection and tracking as it relates to 
investment in qualified opportunity funds, alongside the second set of 
regulations issued by the IRS.173  Unsurprisingly, critics have panned 
this part of the Program’s lag, given the many months the respective 
agencies have had to consider and address this data collection 
deficiency.174  Since the Opportunity Zone Program is run through 
the tax code and the benefit exists in the form of capital gains — 
which are typically reported only when an asset is sold, without 
additional oversight — much of the Program’s day-to-day operation 
will go unchecked.175  This leaves the Program wide open for abuse: 
there are no systems in place to gather information about what 
projects are being developed, how qualified funds are gathering and 
 
BISNOW, https://www.bisnow.com/events/washington-dc/DC-Opportunity-Zones-
1346 [https://perma.cc/ETP5-4DAH ] (last visited May 13, 2019) (noting that “high-
end condominiums, luxury apartments, high-rise hotels, towering offices, and chic 
retail and restaurants” are rising at “an astonishing pace” in low-income areas in 
D.C.). 
 173. REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 78. 
 174. See Tankersly, Treasury Issues Rules, supra note 42 (quoting Olugbenga 
Ajilore, a senior economist with the Center for American Progress, who commented 
that “[t]his [Program] has been in place for 17 months and now you’re going to ask 
for comments about data collection? . . . There needs to be some accountability to the 
community.”); see also Olugbenga Ajilore, Treasury’s Second Set of Guidelines for 
Opportunity Zones Still Leaves Struggling Communities Behind, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (Apr. 25, 2019), 
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dispersing their monies, and how well, or not, the Program is 
benefitting the communities and the residents it is supposed to.176 
The Treasury Department and the IRS must install the proper data 
collection and monitoring tools to track the Program’s effectiveness.  
As it is, the Opportunity Zone Program has drawn its fair share of 
criticism and been denounced as nothing more than a “subsidy for 
gentrification.”177  To combat these real fears, the IRS and the 
Treasury Department must do more to demonstrate that the 
Program’s effectiveness is an important concern.  Adding weight to 
critics’ fears that accountability to the community has not been a 
priority thus far, is based on the fact that no meaningful systems were 
put into place after 17 months to check the activity of qualified funds, 
and these agencies are only now beginning to turn their attention 
towards data collection.178  Moving forward, the IRS and the Treasury 
Department must take into account the comments it receives from 
the public in regard to data collection, and collaborate with proper 
state institutions and organizations to gather the necessary 
information so as to properly asses the Opportunity Zone Program — 
and whether or not it is achieving its goals. 
B. What the States Can Do 
i. States Should Promote a Local Mindset 
Much of the criticism of Enterprise Zone programming revolved 
around the induced jobs created, and specifically, that few of the 
residents within Enterprise Zones benefitted from the opportunities 
generated.179  Commuting times demonstrated that only a small 
portion of the Enterprise Zone residents actually worked within these 
zones, suggesting that many of the Enterprise Zone-created 
employment opportunities were not in fact taken by the residents 
they were created for.180  The rapid gentrification of these distressed 
neighborhoods, furthermore, may lead to both the displacement of 
their residents unable to afford the skyrocketing cost of living in such 
areas and the entry of a population with higher incomes and 
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education.181  While there are currently no provisions or measures in 
place to prevent the Opportunity Zone programming from falling 
victim to the same pitfalls that plagued the Enterprise Zone 
programming,182 states must do their part in promoting practices and 
policies that encourage a local mindset, lest it fall victim to a similar 
eventuality. 
For one, the states could promote so-called smart-gentrification — 
“policies to retain local residents and preserve or expand low-and 
middle-income housing,” even while participating in Opportunity 
Zone programming.183  Smart gentrification posits that gentrification 
in and of itself may not be completely detrimental to low-income 
families, as certain improvements in neighborhood services may be 
beneficial to the original population.184  Instead of restoring 
deteriorating buildings into hotels and headquarters for booming 
technology companies, states could encourage investors to turn this 
real estate into community centers and institutions that will enhance 
services and education in the neighborhood.185  Instead of developing 
luxury apartment buildings with amenities that will inevitably price 
and displace local residents out of their communities, states could 
instead promote the creation of affordable housing that low-income 
families can afford.186  Rather than permitting moneyed companies 
that require high levels of education and skillsets for employment to 
sweep up large tracts of cheap, available real estate in these 
neighborhoods, states could instead support local businesses and local 
hiring initiatives that Opportunity Zone residents could actually 
benefit from.187 
While gentrification does not look the same from neighborhood to 
neighborhood, the effects of rapid gentrification will almost certainly 
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be adverse on the neighborhoods and residents in question.188  Some 
cities have already begun using their regulatory powers to combat 
some of the perils of speedy gentrification.189  The District of 
Columbia, for example, has begun requiring developers to preserve or 
expand affordable housing alongside higher-priced housing.190  The 
smart gentrification effort, an undertaking known as “revitalization 
without gentrification,” channels $550 million into the historic 
African American community Barry Farm, to create 1400 public and 
affordable apartments and recreational and educational centers.191  
After the project is complete, all former residents will be invited back 
to the new development — no one will be displaced, the city has 
pledged.192  In Portland, the Cully Main Street Plan sought to 
preserve the Cully neighborhood’s cultural character and diversity 
even as the neighborhood underwent revitalization and 
development.193  The Cully Main Street Plan’s efforts appear to have 
been successful thus far.  In 2017, the neighborhood’s “adult super 
center,” home to three strip clubs, an adult video establishment, and a 
lingerie shop, was transformed into a 150-unit affordable housing 
complex, a project reflecting the understanding that many residents in 
the Cully community are young, intergenerational families in need of 
such housing.194  In Ohio, Walnut Hills, a predominately African 
American neighborhood in Cincinnati, residents are pushing against 
the kind of rapid gentrification seen in both Cincinnati’s downtown 
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and Over-the-Rhine (OTR) neighborhoods.195  When Walnut Hills 
residents saw “hipsters from all over the city” flocking to their 
neighborhood to enjoy new pop-up eateries and biergartens, they 
took their concerns to the Walnut Hill Redevelopment Foundation, 
claiming that the influx of redevelopment “was helping the outside, 
bringing people in, but not [helping] the neighborhood.”196  With the 
Foundation’s help and development of neighborhood-conscious 
programming, such as the Walnut Hills Reinvestment Plan, which 
supports the development of low-income housing, “the biergartens 
stopped.”197  Given the potentially harmful effects the Opportunity 
Zone Program could hoist upon the very communities and individuals 
it is meant to lift-up, states participating in the Opportunity Zone 
Program should endeavor to engage in smart gentrification projects 
that promote local businesses and hiring, community and educational 
projects, and affordable housing. 
CONCLUSION 
Though still nascent, the Opportunity Zone Program represents 
the potential to lift-up low-income, distressed communities, and their 
residents.  However, the Program should address and improve upon 
several areas, including its current disorganization, the inaccurate 
designation of several Zones, and the potential for it to fall victim to 
similar failures of plagued past land zoning initiatives.  Continuing to 
address investors’ concerns in a timely manner, regulating and 
restricting the types of projects and the amount of investments 
developed in qualified Opportunity Zones, implementing data 
collection and monitoring systems to assess the Program’s progress 
and effectiveness at both the state and federal level, and promoting a 
local mindset will better ensure that the Opportunity Zones will truly 
benefit low-income communities and their residents. 
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